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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BETTE WYCALIS, 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
vs. 
GUARDIAN TITLE COMPANY OF UTAH, 
and WARREN H. CURLIS, Its 
President; CITY FEDERAL SAVINGS 
& LOAN ASSOCIATION; U.S. TITLE 
OF UTAH, Trustee; CITY CONSUMER 
SERVICES, INC., Beneficiary; 
R. M. WALL; GARY L. MEREDITH 
and LYLE G. MEREDITH; ED MAASS, 
RANDY KRANTZ, B. BRAD CHRISTEN-
SON, DEBRA S. CHRISTENSON; 
R & C ASSOCIATES; ROY L. MILLER, 
SHARON L. MILES, and JOHN 
DOES I through X, 
Defendants/Petitioners. 
Suprjeme Court Case No. 890431 
(Utah Court of Appeals 
No1. (880030(A)-CA) 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO GUARDIAN TITLE COMPANY'S PETITION 
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI FROM THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The question presented for review is misstated in 
petitioner's petition. Correctly presented, the question 
presented to the Utah Court of Appeals in both the appeal and the 
petition for rehearing and in this petition is "What is the duty 
of a trustee under a deed of trust when the trustee is presented, 
in the absence of the original trust deed and note, with a forged, 
although purportedly acknowledged, request for reconveyance?" 
OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals may be found as No. 
1 
880030(A)-CA of the records of the Utah Court of Appeals and as 
Wycalis v. Guardian Title of Utah, et al., 116 Utah Adv. Rep. 27 
(Utah Ct.App. 1989). Additionally, there is a related appeal, No. 
88-0030(B)-CA, in which the Court of Appeals rendered a Memorandum 
Decision on October 27, 1989. Appellants in that matter have 
moved this Court for an extension of time in which to file a brief 
in opposition due to the fact that those appellants have 
petitioned the Court of AppeaLs for rehearing in that matter. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF COURT 
Guardian's petition is brought before the Supreme Court of 
the State of Utah pursuant to Rule 42 et seq. of the Rules of the 
Utah Supreme Court. The decision for which review is sought was 
entered by the Utah Court of Appeals on August 29, 1989. 
Petitioners' request for a rehearing was denied by the Court of 
Appeals on September 26, 1989. Petitioners served their petition 
for writ of certiori on October 26, 1989. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT STATUTE 
The interpretation of the following statute is relevant to 
this matter: 
Utah Code Ann. Section 57-1-33 (1953) Satisfaction of 
obligation secured by trust deed—Reconveyance of trust property. 
When the obligation secured by any trust deed has been 
satisfied, the trustee shall, upon written request by the 
beneficiary, reconvey the trust property. The reconveyance 
may designate the grantee therein as "the person or persons 
entitled thereto." The beneficiary under such trust deed 
shall deliver to the trustor or his successor in interest the 
trust deed and the note or other evidence of the obligation 
2 
so satisfied. Any beneficiary under £uch trust deed who 
refuses to request a reconveyance froJn the trustee for a 
period of thirty days after written demand therefor is made 
by the trustor or his successor in interest shall be liable 
to the trustor or his successor in interest, as the case may 
be, for double damages resulting from such refusal, or such 
trustor or his successor in interest may bring an action 
against the beneficiary and trustee to compel a reconveyance 
of the trust property and in such action the judgment of the 
court shall be that the trustee reconyey the trust property 
and that the beneficiary pay to the trustor, or his successor 
in interest, as the case may be, the costs of suit including 
a reasonable attorney's fee and all damages resulting from 
the refusal of the beneficiary to request a reconveyance as 
hereinabove provided. (Emphasis added.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CAi^ E 
by Guardian Title 
her trustee 
The underlying cause out of which this petition arises is an 
action by Bette Wycalis (Wycalis), a beneficiary under a deed of 
trust, for breach of the duty owed Wycalis| 
Company and its President, Warren Curliss, 
(Guardian). Wycalis asserted in her Complhint that Guardian 
breached the duty owed Wycalis when Guardian, in relying upon a 
forged, purportedly acknowledged request for reconveyance, 
reconveyed her security interest in the absence of delivery of the 
original promissory note and deed of trust 
without communication with Wycalis to determine if the note had 
been paid. 
Guardian moved for summary judgment op. the grounds that 
Guardian owed no duty to foresee the criminal act of the forgery 
and that it acted in good faith in relying exclusively upon the 
"acknowledgement" which is given an indicia of authenticity under 
3 
to the trustee and 
Utah law. The trial court granted Guardian's motion for summary 
judgment, which judgment was appealed to the Utah Court of 
Appeals. That Court rendered its opinion on August 29, 1989 
reversing and remanding the case for trial. Guardian petitioned 
the Court of Appeals for rehearing, which petition was denied on 
September 26, 1989. On October 26, 1989 Guardian filed its 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On or about July 1, 1980, defendant R & C Associates 
(R & C) by and through Roy L. Miller, general partner, and Randy 
Krantz, B. Brad Christenson and Debra S. Christenson executed an 
installment promissory note payable to Bette Wycalis and her 
mother, Eva Robertson, in the amount of $61,800.00. (Ex. 1 Krantz 
deposition; Krantz deposition pp. 11-12; Ex. 2, B. Christenson 
deposition; B. Christenson deposition pp. 8, 10 and 17; Ex. 4, 
Wycalis deposition; Wycalis deposition pp. 55-56; D. Christenson 
deposition p. 3.) 
2. The promissory note was payment for Wycalis' interest in 
real property located in Helper, Utah, which she had sold and 
conveyed to defendants Krantz and Christenson. (Ex. 2 Krantz 
deposition; Krantz deposition pp. 5, 9 and 10; Ex. 2, B. 
Christenson deposition; B. Christenson deposition pp. 5-7, 15; Ex. 
4, Wycalis deposition; Wycalis deposition pp. 55-56; D. 
Christenson deposition p. 4.) 
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mother, Eva Robertson, 
(Krantz deposition pp. 
3. On or about June 26, 1980, defendant R & C, as trustor, 
by and through Roy L. Miller, general partner, executed, as 
security for payment of the July 1, 1980, promissory note, a 
second trust deed to substitute for Wycali^f original security in 
the Heljper property naming Wycalis and her 
as beneficiaries, and Guardian as trustee. 
12, 42; B. Christenson deposition pp. 9, 1(^ , 42-43; Ex. 5, Wycalis 
deposition.) 
4. The trust deed of June 26, 1980, (described property 
located in Weber County, State of Utah. (?x. 5, Wycalis 
deposition). 
5. While R & C was an obligor on the promissory note/ as 
among Krantz, Christensons and R & C, the ifinderstanding was that 
Christensons and Krantz were to pay the dept and that R & C loaned 
the security as substitute security for the Helper property for 
consideration and as a return favor for a favor Krantz had done 
Miller. (Krantz deposition pp. 5-7; B. Christenson deposition pp. 
5-17, 21-22, 49.) 
6. On the 31st day of March, 1983, plaintiff was assigned 
her mother's interest in the trust deed ancfl trust deed note. (Ex. 
15, Wycalis deposition; Wycalis deposition 
7. Wycalis received payments, as required by the note, from 
August 20, 1980, until December 1982, at wljiich time defendants 
Krantz and Christenson ceased making payments. (Krantz deposition 
5 
pp. 88-89.) 
p. 41; Ex. 3, B. Christenson deposition; B. Christenson deposition 
pp. 11-13; Wycalis deposition pp. 56, 59-60; D. Christenson 
deposition p. 4.) 
8. Upon the failure of the obligors to make the required 
payments, plaintiff contacted an attorney in order to enforce the 
terms of the trust deed and was advised that her interest in the 
property had been reconveyed. (Wycalis deposition pp. 73-74. ) 
9. Plaintiff's trust deed was reconveyed and she was 
divested of her security interest on December 26, 1980, when 
defendant Guardian Title executed and recorded a deed of 
reconveyance. (Ex. 11, Wycalis deposition; Curlis deposition pp. 
39, 48-50; Miles deposition pp. 10-11.) 
10. Guardian Title executed a deed of reconveyance on 
December 26, 1980, after receiving a forged, although 
acknowledged, request for reconveyance. (Miles deposition pp. 
100-11. ) 
11. Prior to the reconveyance of Wycalis interest, Guardian 
did not require delivery of the original trust deed note or trust 
deed as proof of payment. (Affidavit of Bette Wycalis; R. 
217-218. ) 
12. Guardian did not in any manner communicate with 
plaintiff prior to the reconveyance to determine whether or not 
she had been paid. (Miles deposition pp. 11-12; Curliss 
deposition pp. 48-52; Wycalis deposition pp. 40-43, 60-66.) 
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13. This is so even t.houqh Guardian title knew the address 
of plaintiff,, (Miles depositirr 
14. Gi lard. i ai i TV i I. lie rul ion -..- oly upon the notar I : = • :I 
signature in executing t reconveyance ,M-les deposition p. 12; 
Curlis deposi tion p p JC 
15. Gi lardian Ti tie .i^Je ,.o enquiry to determine :*N-?thcr 
plaintiff was pa id, nor leterm: n« M ! yr^tirm ,--f th^ original 
tr II is t d e e d • :: r ti I. 3 t: ::i< ; 
for reconveyance. (Cbi , . ; aeposition pp. 48 -50; Miles deposition 
p. 12. ) 
• 16. GiJi-mJ J t-ii  Til I c iitivei Lnstructed its employee, Sharon 
Miles, to check personally with any beneficiary p^ior to 
reconveyance :i n ordei uo detennin i, ru» i I' I Ii " benef i,c i <n ' »" Ini 
beei I paid (Mi les deposition p. 12, ) 
17. At: the time of the recoveyanct' , i.h*» plaintiff was i.n 
possessinn III the or ifjinni frunt deed • -n i«I tinrst deed in tie. 
(Affidavit ot Belie Wycaijs •* 217-218.) 
18. The origin^ ^ * •* +Tus f •'•* * -r-s?:4" ip^~ 
exhibits I dii : . . rranscript t ieari"«j pp. ) -9C-5*' 
!'•* P1-'^1 :f4 '*- ' ** * -----
 Lile iequest nor r- - * -
20, Plaintiff did not authorize anyone *:o sian, the request 
£ o r reconveyance on her belMl ; > \( 
7 
217-218. ) 
21. Plaintiff did not authorize reconveyance of her interest 
in the property. (Affidavit of Bette Wycalis; R. 217-218.) 
22. Plaintiff does not know who may have signed her name and 
the name of her mother to the request for reconveyance. 
(Affidavit of Bette Wycalis; R. 217-218.) 
23. Plaintiff does not know, and has never heard of, Ed 
Maass, the notary who notarized the request for reconveyance. 
(Wycalis deposition p. 84.) 
24. Upon reconveyance of the June 26, 1980, trust deed, 
Guardian Title substituted another trust deed dated December 29, 
1980, as security for plaintiff. That trust deed described 
property different than the property described in the June 26, 
1980, trust deed. (Ex. 12, Wycalis deposition; Krantz deposition 
p. 31; Miles deposition pp. 10-11.) 
25. A letter of instruction purportedly bearing the 
signature of plaintiff authorized the substitution of the 
security. (Ex. 8 Wycalis deposition; Miles deposition pp. 8-9.) 
26. Wycalis did not sign the letter of instruction. (Ex. 8, 
Wycalis deposition; Wycalis deposition pp. 77-78.) 
27. Plaintiff did not authorize another to sign her name to 
the letter of instruction. (Affidavit of Bette Wycalis; R. 
217-218. ) 
28. Plaintiff does not know who may have signed her name to 
8 
t h e l e t t e r ~f i n s t r u c t i o n , , r r i . 3 a - . ; ' *f ^ e r t e W y c a l i s ; R. 
2 1 " .. - J . , 
2 9 . 1 I IJ.H1 i i I ill ii in i i i is fii Lei J! hi I he s u b s t i t u t i o n ul 
s e c u r i t y , was n o t aware of t h e s u b s t i t u t i o n , d i d n o t r e c e i v e 
d e l i v * 3 ^ - n C *"he s u b s t i t u t od t rw. i t tic.-'1 n . l ", r-n • " 
o - c I .i i in, any i n t e i e s l in t h e s u b s t i t u t e d s e c u r i t y . 
( A f f i d a v i t (if B e t t e W y c a l i s N 217-218 ) 
. 3 0 , u I " i in.it *• l v ' lit mi «i 11' i t .'.I i! .-!' t-st i 1 I .i i hi I I ' 1 lie 
Decembei ^'J, I'JlllJ, t r u s t deed was r e c o n v e y e d by G u a r d i a n r * 
A p r i ] , JLJU1, [ L ; . 1, M i l e s d e p o s i t i o n ; I ^ i l e s d e p o s i t i o i 
8 r - » . ) • 
31 m,_" r e c o n v e y a n c e f i : ) c c u i : e d af+'pr 
G u a r d i a n Ti + *- r o r ^ i r - ^ ^ * - 'au*^ f" 1 
f c •.-.•• .; .
 c, .> o ^ * ^ * . , ^ -v *. i s a e p o s i t ; ,i 
3 2 , D e f e n d a n t C u r l i s doe.4- n o t KIIO. I :
 r . a m U f f ' s *iot« h a s 
been pa jd M i i r M n riepo.s i 1 in i 1 ni nil i 
J J , Roy i Mil Lei and K b C A s s o c i a t e s , t r u s t o i uf 11m 
W y c a l i s t r u s t deed have f i lPH in b a n k r u p ^ c , ' ' b ank rup t ry N •; 
82-M-0?Qm in II NI D I M ' HI II M ! Il B a n k r u p t c y L . , \ 
for 'lit- Distuct of Utah, i 
RESPONSK TO PETITIONER 3 ARGUMENT , 
INTRODUCTION 
Guardian's petiti on before this court oresents the ;1entical 
issues for review as were bef~: * - \ i i 
9 
offers no new authority or rationale as to why the Court of 
Appeals erred, only that it "appeared not to address" Guardian's 
principal argument. Wycalis responds to Guardian's three 
arguments as follows. 
RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S POINT I 
Petitioners' argument that the Court of Appeals decision in 
this case is in conflict with Gray v. Scott, 565 P.2d 76 (Utah 
1977) is sheer nonsense, as is petitioner's assertion that the 
Court of Appeals "did not appear to directly address Guardian's 
argument that it owed no duty to plaintiff to foresee a deliberate 
criminal act perpetuated by another." (Petition page 9, emphasis 
added.) The argument is disingenuous. The entirety of 
petitioner's case argued to the Court of Appeals was founded upon 
that argument. Petitioner expended 32 pages in its brief 
expounding the merits of that theory to the Court of Appeals. 
Petitioner's case and theory were argued thoroughly to the Court 
of Appeals and that court ruled against petitioners, discreetly 
and considerately not mentioning the degree by which their theory 
is wide of the mark. That this is true is shown repeatedly 
through the Court of Appeals' decision wherein that court holds 
that Guardian owed Wycalis a duty. ( E.g. "It does not 
necessarily follow, however, that a trust deed trustee can be said 
to have fully discharged its duty of care in reconveyxng property 
in response to a written submission which includes an acknowledged 
10 
requef; * f o j - e r o n v e y a n r v ' ;vo , r * -i ~i^a s O p i n i o n : , 
f <[)<:) -
owed by Guaraian t ;< wycalis i : fixed r s * of 
^ n p p ^ i c O r "" ^" '"^ r - '~>inP t h ^ "* c*<?fz Oi i? ^ r d ^ a r~i h a ° *•* ^  * i^c***}^ y v f"+" *** ^ t ^ d 
1 . •_ •_ 
whei. presented w.tn - request for reconveyance has 
estrb -—. either or these wav ' ' V < ~ 
pg WA„ lostimony ma^ / .,* parti.^u. ai , ^ wdipi.^ 
elucidating the standard of care applicable here.",,, Court of 
Appeal s Opi 1 :i :i 01 : ]:: g 9 I: I:  = 8; ' 0" 11 : = iipt : .«*s 1 s 11 1 ey 1. J 1 f • 
analysis should not, be taken as an implicit rejection of Wycalls' s 
contention that a trust dppd trustee 1 ° * f i d u c i a r y hpilri to <i 
h i gl l e r s t a n d m il 1 li>ni 111 Il 1 1 II 1 1 1 . 1 1 7 . . , ,„, < " " i " n i 1 II n l 
Appeals Opinion pq , 'I footnotp 9.) 
Any doubt upon this qunntinn was complex1" r^ rnc 
C o u r t • :i)f Appeals denied peLitiunei fs request i^ i iwiea. , *; .* * ;_..,1 
comment. In that Petition for Rehearing Guardian argued; "In 
r -- •• 
tha • , . - ,uui: - * ,it..y 1 -nanunai . i<iqii-t-* * ;ie 
coui t - . ,1 :,'"* address Guardian ' ,-irqumpi t • h. * * >wpd * 'o 
P 
Petition : Kenttd:i'i^  puu^ ••» * ;* , , r ? -enearinq 
-pinion. ... • 
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of Appeals directly and correctly addressed Guardian's argument 
holding that the case of Gray v. Scott, 565 P.2d 76 (Utah 1977) 
which involved a stranger's duty to foresee a murder of a third 
party did not apply to the contractual setting in which a deed of 
trust deed trustee contracted to protect the interest of its 
beneficiary. 
Finally, Guardian's theory is not applicable because it was 
not the criminal act which caused the loss of Wycalis's security. 
Had Guardian properly performed its duty as a trustee the criminal 
act would have resulted in no harm. It was the negligent reliance 
by Guardian and its president Warren Curliss upon the product of 
the criminal act which caused the loss of Wycalis's security, not 
the criminal act itself. 
RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S POINT II 
Under Point II Guardian asserts that the Court of Appeals 
based its opinion upon issues not raised at trial in ruling that 
additional testimony upon the standard of care in the industry was 
required. 
The Court of Appeals did not err in remanding the matter for 
trial upon the standard of care in the industry. Wycalis argued 
both at the trial court and on appeal, as does Guardian in this 
petition, that based upon the uncontroverted facts of record, this 
case could be decided as a matter of law. The Court of Appeals 
disagreed and was unwilling to make such determination in the 
12 
absence of evidence of the standard of fare in the industry, 
I I 1 HI I I II I I I A | 11 I I l i I I I I ' l l I I I I I HI I , | I . '" I < ! l . I i l l I I 1 I i l l I M l I ' ' ! » I ' i t I » I l l 1 " i 
issue by asserting that; the Court ol Appeals raised a defense •• -
raised by Wyralis at the ti 1 a ] I eve] Correctly stated however, 
i n L 1;JJ r u J J i mm , t I le Court of Appeals 1 ie,]l • ::1 tha t Guai diai I 1 la :I I:ai Il eel 
to . arry its burden under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
- J mi :J iii:: eqi i :ii i: es G :iai: d :ii ai : t: :: • =s s tab] 1 sh fc a. sed i ip ::)i I 
uncontrover ted facts of record, tha t i t was en titled to a, judgment 
as ' .-t-rer of 1 a/w The Court: of Appea I s specificall y he] d that 
:: ' agr ee t:l la t tl le s tai idar d c f: car e D\ *ed b":; i G\ lar d :ii an: i t: :: 
K*vr,2, , , . n x e d ir . i-. . -- ^ r DI.IUCI*. a n a s a m a t t e r o f 
i-
 tjr'-a . .._ t a b 1 i, "iii11 II, I i d 1: 
.it vas entitled -•* udgment a? a mattei 
RESPONSE ._ •^••>c: ^ PL1N1 . 
Guardian offers no reasor whatsoever as - - \. **e Court of 
Appeals is inadeauarp to decide the issue presented. Guardian 
Appeals' decision is contrary the holding of G r a ^ v. Scott. 
Guardian's ^.raumpr '• -]*•*- i'vr-- ; : - t-~, j^ t-i*-* -i • z. - ! f i r^i- a 
merit. 
With regard to Gi lardi an's "second significant poir e ' a;* to 
why this decision should be i: e viewed by thlis court b , h argument 
II 3 " . ' • , 
deals with the indicia of authenticity given acknowledgements, 
Guardian starts out by misstating the facts of record. Guardian 
asserts that the request for reconveyance was "properly 
acknowledged". This is simply not true. Guardian assumed for 
purposes of its motion for summary judgment that the signature was 
a forgery. It is then nonsense to assert that a forged signature 
is properly acknowledged when the signature subject of the 
purported acknowledgement is admitted to be a fraud. 
The question concerning the indicia of authenticity afforded 
an acknowledgement was adequately addressed in footnote 10 of the 
Court of Appeals' decision where it is stated: 
It is of course true that acknowledged documents have a 
special status in certain contexts. Properly acknowledged 
documents may be admitted into evidence without other 
evidence of their authenticity. See Utah R. Evid. 902(8). 
Subject to certain exceptions, see Utah Code Ann„ Section 
57-4a-3 (1986), only acknowledged documents are entitled to 
recordation. Utah Code Ann. Section 57-3-1 (1986). It does 
not necessarily follow, however, that a trust deed trustee 
can be said to have fully discharged its duty of care in 
reconveying property in response to a written submission 
which includes an acknowledged request for reconveyance. 
CONCLUSION 
There is nothing new, different or significant in the rehash 
of Guardian's arguments presented in its Petition. All issues 
presented in this petition were adequately and correctly addressed 
by the Court of Appeals. There is nothing new or of substance 
which warrants the time of this Court or that of the responding 
parties. As such, Wycalis requests the petition be denied and 
14 
damages be awarded pursuant to Rule 33 and Rule 40 of the Rules of 
the Utah Supreme Court, 
Dated: November 1989. 
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ORME, Judge: 
Bette Wycalis, formerly the beneficiary under a trust 
deed, appeals the trial court's entry of summary judgment 
terminating her action against Guardian Title of Utah, the 
trust deed trustee, and its president, Warren Curlis. This 
appeal was consolidated with another which 
separate judgment entered in the same case, 
opinion treats only the Wycalis appeal. We 
for further proceedings. 
arose from a 
However, this 
reverse and remand 
FACTS 
In July 1980, Wycalis sold Randy Krantz and Brad and 
Debra Christenson a parcel of real estate located in Helper, 
Utah. A promissory note dated July 1# 1980, payable to Wycalis 
and her mother, Eva Robertson, was delivered to Wycalis as 
partial payment for the Helper property.1 The makers of the 
promissory note were R & C Associates, Krantz, and the 
Christensons. The note was secured by a standard, short form 
trust deed dated June 26, 1980. The trust deed, signed only by 
R & C Associates, was properly executed and created a lien in 
Wycalisfs favor on a parcel of Weber County property owned by 
R & C Associates. Guardian Title was named as trustee under 
the trust deed. 
Wycalis received payments on the note from August 1980 
through December 1982, at which time all payments ceased, 
leaving the note substantially unpaid. Wycalis then contacted 
Guardian to enforce her rights under the trust deed. Guardian 
informed Wycalis that on December 26, 1980, the Weber County 
property had been reconveyed to the trustor, R & C Associates, 
pursuant to a request for reconveyance allegedly bearing 
Wycalis9s signature. Wycalis protested this divestment of her 
security interest in the property. Subsequent investigation 
revealed that Wycalisfs signature had been forged on the 
request for reconveyance which Guardian had received and relied 
on in reconveying the trust deed property. 
The forged request for reconveyance was acknowledged by a 
notary who was either duped or corrupted. This document was 
accompanied by a letter requesting the substitution of a trust 
deed on different property as security for the promissory 
note.2 Wycalis^ signature was also forged on this letter. 
1. On March 31, 1983, Eva Robertson assigned her interest in 
the promissory note to Wycalis. 
2. Following the reconveyance of the original trust deed and 
pursuant to the letter's instructions, Guardian recorded the 
substituted trust deed in favor of Wycalis. This second deed 
encumbered a parcel of property different from the Weber County 
parcel initially encumbered. Thereafter, this second trust 
deed was reconveyed by Guardian after it received yet another 
forged request for reconveyance. Wycalis does not claim any 
interest in the property purportedly secured by the subsequent 
trust deed nor does she claim any damages arising from its 
reconveyance. 
Upon receiving the two forged documents, Guardian did not 
contact Wycalis to verify her request, nor did it require 
delivery of the original promissory note or trust deed, 
although the request for reconveyance recited the note had been 
paid and erroneously indicated these documents were attached.3 
Wycalis filed a complaint against Guardian, Curlis, 
Krantz, the Christensons, and a number of other parties not 
involved in this or the related appeal. Wycalis claimed that 
Guardian Title breached its duty as trustee by reconveying the 
trust deed property and releasing her corresponding security 
interest based on a forged request for reconveyance. Wycalis 
also sought a judgment against Krantz and the Christensons for 
the unpaid balance of the promissory note. The trial court 
entered summary judgment against Wycalis and in favor of 
Guardian. The trial court also entered summary judgment in 
favor of Wycalis and against Krantz and the Christensons for 
the unpaid balance of the promissory note. As indicated, both 
judgments have been appealed, but we treat only the former in 
this opinion. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The procedural history of Wycalis9s claim against 
Guardian is important to an understanding of our decision and 
merits detailed review. 
Prior to Guardian9s successful motion for summary 
judgment, Wycalis filed a motion for partial summary judgment 
on the question of Guardian's liability, wycalis claimed 
Guardian was liable for the loss of her security interest 
because the reconveyance was unauthorized. 
cases in support of her argument. E,g,, HucKell v. Matrgpqa, 
160 Cal. Rptr* 177 (Cal. App. 1979); Doyle 
She cited several 
Vt Svyetv Title & 
Guar. Co., 68 Cal. Rptr. 177 (Cal. App. 1968); Jeanese, Inc. v. 
(Cal. App. 1959). 
inguish those cases 
Surety Title & Guar. Co.. 1 Cal. Rptr. 752 
Guardian's response was, primarily, to dis 
from the instant case, claiming that they involved situations 
where &£ authorization had been received by the trustee while 
3.The reference to the note being .paid and to these documents 
being attached is curious, not only because they were not 
attached, but also because a request to substitute security is 
altogether inconsistent with a representation that the note has 
been paid. 
Guardian had received apparent, acknowledged authorization to 
reconvey the property. Since "the acknowledgment of a document 
gives rise to a presumption of its genuineness," Guardian 
argued, a factual question existed concerning whether the 
trustee's unquestioning reliance on that document was 
consistent with the applicable duty of care. Guardian observed 
that the only case relied on by Wycalis involving a forged 
request for reconveyance was not resolved as a matber of law 
but instead had been submitted to the trier of fact. Ssfi 
Stephana v. Herman. 37 Cal. Rptr. 746 (Cal. App. 1964). 
Guardian emphasized the need for "evidence as to the standard 
of care in the local title company industry" before it could 
properly be determined that Guardian breached its duty. 
Wycalis9s response was uncharacteristic of modern 
litigants. She conceded the validity of Guardian*s argument, 
the inescapable presence of material factual questions, and the 
corresponding need for a trial. Accordingly, she withdrew her 
motion. 
It was several months later that Guardian filed its own 
motion for summary judgment, now changing its tack 
considerably. Guardian argued that it owed no duty to foresee 
and protect against criminal acts, such as forgery, and that, 
in any event, it was entitled to rely on the acknowledged 
request as a matter of law. In her response, Wycalis 
unfortunately failed to remind the court of Guardian's prior 
concession of unavoidable factual issues and of the need for 
standard-of-care-in-the-industry evidence, which had not been 
offered by Guardian in support of its motion.4 Nor did 
4. The record contains two affidavits submitted by Guardian 
which merit comment in this regard. The first affidavit is 
that of Craig Thomsen, president of a local title company, 
which was submitted by Guardian in its opposition to Wycalis*s 
motion for summary judgment but not relied on in support of its 
own motion. Moreover, Guardian contended that Thomsen*s 
affidavit demonstrated the need for a trial and the impropriety 
of Wycalis*s motion, not that Thomsen9s affidavit established 
the standard of care as a matter of law. The second affidavit 
is that of Warren Curlis, which is also insufficient to 
establish the standard of care as a matter of law. Curlis does 
not attempt to identify any industry standard in his affidavit, 
but merely states his own personal experience and the fact that 
he had not previously encountered a forged request for 
reconveyance. Thus, these affidavits do not establish that 
Guardian met the applicable standard of care as a matter of law. 
Wycalis directly refute Guardian's new legal arguments. 
Instead, she too changed tack. In essence, her response was 
that Guardian9s new arguments were irrelevant because a forged 
reconveyance, even if acknowledged, is an absolute nullity. 
Thus, according to Wycalis, Guardian had, in effect, released 
the security without any authority whatsoever and was therefore 
liable for the loss as a matter of law. 
It was in this posture of each party asserting its 
entitlement to judgment as a matter of law that the district 
court took Guardian's motion for summary judgment under 
advisement. Thereafter, the district court 
motion, concluding that the "great weight' 
acknowledged documents entitled Guardian to 
in this case since there was no showing that 
reason to suspect a forgery. The propriety)of that disposition 
is the gravamen of this appeal. 
granted Guardian's 
afforded 
rely on the request 
Guardian had any 
STANDARD FOR APPELLATE REVIEW OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Summary disposition of lawsuits is 
necessary tool in a judicial system such as 
for the efficient and timely resolution of 
Granting summary judgment saves the parties 
time and expense of a full-blown trial. &££, 
Interwesti Inc. v. Design ASSQCS-* 635 p.2d 
1981). However, summary judgment is approprl 
"the pleadings, depositions, answers to inte 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as 
a valuable and 
ours, which strives 
legal disputes, 
and the courts the 
&x£., Ainjacs 
53, 54 (Utah 
iate only where 
rrogatories/ and 
if any, show 
fact and that 
matter of law." 
Ingram v.I Salt Lake Citv. 
terber v. Farmers 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). See, e.g., 
733 P.2d 126, 126 (Utah 1987) (per curiam); 
Ins, Exch.. 751 P.2d 248, 251 (Utah Ct. App. 
Hoicomb. 740 P.2d 281, 283 (Utah Ct. App. 19 
courts scrutinize summary judgments under th 
applied by the trial courts, according no pa 
to the trial court's legal conclusions conce 
material facts are in dispute and, if they a 
result obtains. See, e.g., Madsen v. Borthi 
247 (Utah 1988); AtldS Corp. vt ClOVlS Nat'l 
225, 229 (Utah 1987). 
[W]e consider the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the losing party, and 
affirm only where it appears there is no 
1988); Priqqs v, 
17). Appellate 
same standard 
'ticular deference 
rning whether the 
:e not, what legal 
&, 769 P.2d 245, 
Bank, 737 P.2d 
genuine dispute as to any material iss^ ues 
of fact, or where, «"•» •c$25inSparty, facts as contended by the losing  ^ 
the moving party is entitled to
 3 
as a matter of law. 
Thorny y ffft^ull ™?n'i*££' 75? 5 . " *£*2U?j£lsai*™ 
1979). Ssfl alaa 
P.2d at 283. 
Every summary judgment must wi^|tand s c r u t i n y ^ ^ ^ ^ 
foregoing standards, even where • ^ "•J.Sj,, the parties' . 
w?th9cross-motions f o r » « f
 i"s^„*si?"tions that the material 
apparent mutual P;je«»$i°\ind™, nSt automatically follow that 
facts are not in dispute, it foesno
 t i o n s for 
summary disposition i V f ^ f a c t o ? dissipate factual issues, 
summary judgment do «?**«£**§*? .. that they are entitled 
even though both parties contend —
 x i s s u e s of fact, 
to prevail because there are nom^er
 T ^ ^ ^ 
Anriaca, 635 P.2d at 55. Sflfl alaa »' »^ '
 2 d 7(J5 706 
jfi*frr: T ^ „ . Co., 23-Ua / d 2 ; Jf t ^ 2 , , involving a 
(1968). Rather, cross-motions may
 i s s u e of fact exists 
mntention by each movant cnac «« * concession that no 
uSSerlhe theory i'f^lSio^.Sv.ncId by its adversary 
dispute remains under the theory au ^^^_Cfl 7 6 2 P.2d 1123, 
Ss^ La. . Prfil-ffnno •. Qi^nj mt Tnfft « cross.m0vant 
1124 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). In • " * K ; d % 0 judgment as a matter 
favor of the other s i d e . 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN NEGLIGENCE CASES 
The summary judgment challenged here d i s p o s e s ^ J " ^ 
amounts to a negligence claim by ^ c a i ? s a 2 o n t e n d s that 
MA note 9, lapj j . S P ^ « " ? i s t S under the t rus t deed 
S S S i S T ^ S i " - " t e r e s t ^ i t h o u t her actual 
I.MTI inn for summary 
esonTtrSutrS!aSU^t?o J s S
 w
S h 8
' - " « * ~ ~ S t i t l e d to judgment as a matter of law. 
Slit 
in 
authorization. As a general proposition, summary judgment is 
inappropriate to resolve a negligence claim on its merits, and 
should be employed "only in the most clear-cut case." Ingram. 
733 P.2d at 126. £££ &]JS£ Apache Tank Lin^s, Inc. v. Cheney, 
706 P.2d 614, 615 (Utah 1985) (per curiam); Williams v. Melbv. 
699 P.2d 723, 725 (Utah 1985); Anderson v. Toone. 671 P.2d 170, 
172 (Utah 1983); Bowen v. Riverton Citv. 656 P.2d 434, 436 
(Utah 1982). Of particular concern is the precept that 
"[o]rdinarily, whether a defendant has breached the required 
standard of care is a question of fact for the jury." Jackson 
v. Dabnev. 645 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1982). fififi alS£ Ingram, 733 
P.2d at 127; Bowen. 656 P.2d at 437; FMA Acceptance Co. v. 
Leatherbv Ins. Co.. 594 P.2d 1332, 1334-35 J (Utah 1979); EfiMSiUl 
v. Robison, 16 Utah 2d 2, 394 P.2d 876, 877 (1964). 
Accordingly, summary judgment is inappropriate unless the 
applicable standard of care is "fixed by law," Elmer v. 
Vanderford, 445 P.2d 612, 614 (Wash. 1968)i &££ jalS£ Chicago, 
Rock Island and Pac. R.R. v. Hawes, 424 P.Id 6, 10 (Okla. 
1967), and reasonable minds could reach but one conclusion as 
to the defendant's negligence under the circumstances. See 
Jackson, 645 P.2d at 615; Singleton Y. Alexander, 19 Utah 2d 
292, 431 P.2d 126, 129 (1967); English v. kienke, 774 P.2d 
1154, 1156 (Ct. App. 1989). Furthermore, the Utah Supreme 
Court has held that since summary disposition denies the losing 
party -the privilege of a trial," art. I, $ 11 of the Utah 
Constitution6 suggests that "doubt or uncertainty as to the 
questions of negligence . • . should be resolved in favor of 
granting . . . a trial." Butler v. Sports Haven Inf 1, 563 
P.2d 1245, 1246 (Utah 1977). Sfifi jSLlfifl Anderson, 671 P.2d at 
172; Rees v. Albertson's, Inc., 587 P.2d lio, 133 (Utah 1978). 
With the foregoing standards in mind, we must determine 
whether Wycalis's negligence claim was properly resolved by the 
district court as a matter of law, given the posture of the 
case. 
IMPROPRIETY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT FlOR GUARDIAN 
There are two fundamental problems with the summary 
judgment at issue in this appeal. First, we cannot agree that 
the standard of care owed by Guardian to W^calis is "fixed by 
6. Art. I, § 11 is commonly known as the *open courts" 
provision. 
law* or even conducive to an "as a matter of law" 
determination, especially in the absence of uncontroverted 
standard-of-the-industry evidence. 
It is true that the applicable standard of care in a 
given case may be established, as a matter of law, by 
legislative enactment or prior judicial decision. Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 285 (1965)• £&S Alsa Elmer v. Vanderford, 
445 P.2d 613, 614 (Wash. 1968). Nonetheless, Guardian has not 
demonstrated that the standard of care owed by a trustee under 
a trust deed when presented with a request for reconveyance has 
been established in either of these ways. Thus, we are not 
convinced that the applicable,, standard has yet been established 
in Utah "as a matter of law.*7 Accordingly, the standard 
must be established factually in the course of ultimate 
7. We necessarily reject Wycalis's contention that trust deed 
trustees are subject to what in essence would be a strict 
liability standard. In this regard, Wycalis relies on Utah 
Code Ann. § 57-1-33 (1986), which provides, with our emphasis, 
that Twlhen the obligation secured bv anv trust deed has been 
satisfied, the trustee shall, upon written request by the 
beneficiary, reconvey the trust property.* Wycalis suggests 
this language means the trustee has no authority to reconvey 
property while the obligation is unpaid, and if the trust 
property is reconveyed in such circumstances, the trustee is 
strictly liable to the beneficiary. Such a construction is at 
odds with actual commercial practice under which a beneficiary 
is entitled to have the property reconveyed upon his or her 
instruction, whether or not the obligation has been paid, 
either because the beneficiary and the obligor agree to 
substitute other security, upon receipt of additional 
consideration, as part of a loan work-out, or simply because 
the beneficiary feels like it. A reading of § 57-1-33 in its 
entirety suggests that it is intended to operate only as a 
procedural guide for trustees. We note that in drafting 
S 57-1-33 the Legislature was very explicit and went to great 
lengths to define the duties of the beneficiary and the 
resulting liability for breach of those duties. In light of 
this observation, we cannot agree that the Legislature intended 
the first eleven words of § 57-1-33 to impose strict liability 
on trustees. If such an onerous burden was intended, we think 
the Legislature would have explicitly said so rather than leave 
the matter for inference. 
resolution of this case, with an emphasis 6n standard-of-care-
in-the-industry evidence,8 
As discussed above, a trial court may not grant summary 
judgment and thereby deny the plaintiff a trial on the 
negligence issue, including resolving the applicable standard 
of care, unless it correctly concludes that the jury could not 
reasonably find the defendant's conduct to be negligent.9 
See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 285 comment f at 22 
(1965). We hold that a jury could reasonably conclude the 
standard of care owed by Guardian to Wycalis required more than 
unquestioning reliance on the forged request, even though 
8. Expert testimony may be particularly helpful in elucidating 
the standard of care applicable here. Where the average person 
has little understanding of the duties owed by particular 
trades or professions, expert testimony must ordinarily be 
presented to establish the standard of care. For instance, 
expert testimony has been required to establish the standard of 
care for medical doctors, Chadwick v. Nielsbn. 763 P.2d 817, 
821 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); architects. Naumab v. Harold K. 
Beecher & Assocs., 24 Utah 2d 172, 467 P.2d| 610, 615 (1970); 
engineers, National Housing Indust., Inc. vL E. L. Jones Dev. 
£g., 118 Ariz. 374, 576 P.2d 1374, 1377 (CtL App. 1978); 
insurance brokers, cf. Darner Motor Sales, Inci v, Universal 
Underwriters Ins, Co,* 140 Ariz. 383, 682 p 
(establishing standard of care "may require 
|.2d 388, 403 (1984) 
expert testimony*); 
and professional estate executors. Estate of Beach, 125 Cal. 
Rptr. 570, 542 P.2d 994, 1001 (1975) (en bahc). But see 
Panieli form, Johnson & Menflenhell v» Hilton Hotels Corp.* 642 
P.2d 1086, 1087 (Nev. 1982) (expert testimony not required to 
prove negligence of surveyor). 
9. Our emphasis on "negligence" analysis s 
as an implicit rejection of Wycalis's conte 
deed trustee is a fiduciary held to a stand 
of ordinary care. On the contrary, courts 
a trust deed trustee is a fiduciary. See, 
Ticor Title Ins. Co.. 658 Supp. 944, 950 (D 
Hoffman v. First Bond 8» Mort. Co.. 116 Conn 
658 (1933). Sfifi also Spruill v. Ballard, 5 
(D.C. App. 1932) ("trustee named in a deed 
loan sustains a fiduciary relation to the d 
creditor") (cited with approval in Blodaett 
P.2d 298, 302 (Utah 1978)). Nonetheless, tt^  
ould not be taken 
tion that a trust 
rd higher than one 
ave recognized that 
A / Mclntvre v. 
Alaska 1986); 
320, 164 A. 656, 
F.2d 517, 519 
f trust to secure a 
btor as well as the 
Vt Martsch, 590 
e fiduciary nature 
Qftnnon_r»& 
apparently acknowledged,10 as the basis for reconveying the 
beneficiary1s interest. In short, Guardian was correct when it 
asserted, in opposing Wycalis*s prior motion for summary 
judgment, that the standard of care could not be established, 
as a practical matter, without a trial. 
Second, and closely related to the point above, we 
believe t^ hat a jury could also reasonably conclude that 
Guardian breached whatever duty it owed Wycalis even though it 
relied on an acknowledged document. Although the posture of 
this case admittedly leaves us with some doubt as to whether 
Wycalis can convince a jury that she is entitled to prevail, 
consistent with precedent we resolve that doubt in favor of 
permitting Wycalis an opportunity to proceed to trial. Sfifi 
Butlfii, 563 P.2d at 1246-47, 
(Footnote 9 continued) 
of the trustee's responsibility really goes to the standard of 
care to which a trustee is held, rather than to supplant 
negligence analysis. Sfifl# e.o., Estate of Beach. 125 Cal. 
Rptr. 570, 542 P.2d 994, 1001 (1975) (en banc) (fiduciary held 
to "more stringent standards,* consistent with rule that 
"[t]hose undertaking to render expert services in the practice 
of a profession or trade are required to have and apply the 
skill, knowledge and competence ordinarily possessed by their 
fellow practitioners under similar circumstances, and failure 
to do so subjects them to liability for negligence"). 
10. It is of course true that acknowledged documents have a 
special status in certain contexts. Properly acknowledged 
documents may be admitted into evidence without other evidence 
of their authenticity. SfiS Utah R. Evid. 902(8). Subject to 
certain exceptions, ass Utah Code Ann. § 57-4a-3 (1986), only 
acknowledged documents are entitled to recordation. Utah Code 
Ann. § 57-3-1 (1986). It does not necessarily follow, however, 
that a trust deed trustee can be said to have fully discharged 
its duty of care in reconveying property in response to a 
written submission which includes an acknowledged request for 
reconveyance. 
CONCLUSION 
The summary judgment is reversed. W^ remand for trial or 
such other proceedings as may be appropriate. The parties 
shall bear their own costs of this appeal. 
Grego, STKT Orme, Judge 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
Russell W. Bencnyou 
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INTRODUCTION 
Respondents Guardian Title Company of Utah and 
Warren H. Curlis (hereafter collectively "Guardian-) 
respectfully petition this Court, pursuant to Rule 35 of the 
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, to grant a rehearing to 
consider one issue Guardian submits the Court overlooked in its 
Opinion issued August 29, 1989. In ruling that the case must 
be remanded to resolve factual issues that precluded the trial 
court's entry of summary judgment, the Court did not address 
Guardian's argument that it owed no duty to plaintiff to 
foresee a deliberate criminal act. Under «Utah law it is clear 
that one has no duty to foresee and act upon a deliberate 
criminal act perpetrated by another. Guardians submits that 
this rule of law dictates as a matter of law that it cannot be 
liable to plaintiff in this action. 
APCVH5NT 
This Court reversed the trial court's summary judgment 
on the basis that there was no evidence before the trial court 
as to the standard of care that must be satisfied by a trustee 
under a deed of trust when it is presented with a forged, 
albeit properly acknowledged, request for reconveyance. In so 
ruling, the Court raised on plaintiff's behalf arguments that 
plaintiff did not raise below, and then resolved those 
arguments in plaintiff's favor. 
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In this process, however, the Coiirt appears to have 
overlooked one of Guardian's principal arguments to support the 
trial court's summary judgment—that it had no duty to foresee 
a deliberate criminal act. In this case, plaintiff alleges 
that some third party forged her name to the request for 
reconveyance that was presented to Guardian, and upon which 
Guardian relied to execute a deed of reconveyance of 
plaintiff's deed of trust. As Guardian a 
brief, it is hornbook law that one has no) 
criminal misconduct of third parties. 
In Gray v. Scott, 565 P.2d 76 (dtah 1977), the 
plaintiff in a wrongful death action appealed from a jury 
pgued in its initial 
duty to foresee the 
the decedent had been 
defendant Beehive Elks 
verdict in favor of defendant. In Gray, 
a guest at a New Year's Eve party at the 
Lodge. During the party, he got into a ffight with another 
guest, Scott, at which point the lodge manager intervened and 
the parties departed. After both parties had left, the manager 
was told there had been a shooting outside in the alley. 
Neither the manager nor anyone else made any investigation. 
Later, both the decedent and Scott returned to the party, and 
Scott shot and killed the decedent. 
Plaintiff brought suit against jkcott as well as the 
lodge, asserting that the lodge, after ip became aware of a 
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scuffle between the decedent and Scott and a shooting incident 
in the alley, owed a legal duty to the decedent to take steps 
to prevent the fatal shooting from occurring. 
After a jury verdict was rendered in favor of the 
defendant lodge, plaintiff appealed, arguing that the trial 
court had erred in giving the following instruction: 
You are instructed that a private lodge or 
association, as well as its officers, has no 
duty to anyone to anticipate that a jjjmD 
will be committed bv another person, and to 
act upon that belief. 
Id. at 77 (emphasis added). 
The Supreme Court rejected plaintiffs argument. Even 
though the lodge manager was aware of a shooting incident in 
the alley, and thus the imminent risk of serious injury to 
those at the party, the Court held that the foregoing 
instruction properly stated Utah law: *[I]t was not error to 
instruct that defendants had no duty to antic^p^^ frho 
commission of the subject crime." Ifl. at 78 (emphasis added). 
The rule declared in Qx$Y vf Scott disposes of the 
issue before this Court as a matter of law. in Gray, the 
defendant lodge manager was on notice of a specific and grave 
risk of harm to plaintiff and other guests. There had been a 
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shooting right outside his party. One jnight, in such a 
situation, reasonably foresee a shooting inside the party. 
Yet, the Court there held that defendant owed no duty to 
anticipate and protect plaintiff from tpe defendant's criminal 
act. 
The record in this case, quite 
indicates that Guardian had no notice whatsoever of any risk 
that plaintiff might be victimized by a criminal act. Instead, 
in reliance on a properly acknowledged request for 
reconveyance, Guardian performed the duties imposed on it by 
the Utah Code and reconveyed the trust property. It never had 
any reason to believe or suspect that tjhe request was not 
authentic. 
to the contrary, 
The forgery was unforeseeable 
the record shows, Guardian has executed 
deeds of reconveyance based on written 
reconveyance. On no other occasion has 
forged request. R. at 399-400. This c 
completely unforeseeable to Guardian; uhder Gray v. Scott. 
Guardian owed no legal duty to protect blaintiff against it. 
See also Respondents' Brief on Appeal, pp. 28-37. 
^s a matter of law. As 
literally hundreds of 
(requests for 
there ever been a 
biminal forgery was 
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CONCLUSION 
The case at bar cannot be distinguished from Gray v. 
Scott. Respondents submit this Court should reconsider its 
prior Opinion, and affirm the trial court's summary judgment. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 12th day of September, 
1989. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK .STHCQpNOUGH 
David R. M0iney 
' George W</pratt 
Attorneys for Guardian Title 
Company of Utah and Warren H, 
Curlis 
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